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CRIMINAL LAW - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FOURTH AMENDMENT -
SEARCH AND SEIZURE - VALID AND INVALID SEARCH WARRANT -
REDACTION - The United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit has held that evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant
which contains both valid and invalid clauses may result in sever-
ance of the warrant in order to suppress only that evidence seized
pursuant to the invalid clauses, preserving for admissibility the
validly seized evidence.
United States v. Christine, 687 F.2d 749 (3d Cir. 1982).
In late November 1979, a federal magistrate for the District of
New Jersey received from the United States an affidavit written by
Richard Scott, an investigator of the Inspector General's Office of
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).' The
affidavit, a result of investigations performed pursuant to fraud
provisions in HUD's Title I Home Insurance Program,2 alleged
that Howard Christine and Perry Grabosky, owners of Landmark
Builders, Inc., had fraudulently secured' HUD Title I Home Im-
provement Loans for persons who were not creditworthy.4 Accord-
ing to the affidavit, Christine and Grabosky intended to operate
the company for a short period of time, during which they would
increase their credit lines and exhaust their assets,3 and then even-
tually abandon the business. 6
Based on information contained in the affidavit, a warrant was
issued which authorized any postal inspector to search the
Landmark Builders, Inc. offices7 and to seize any property de-
1. United States v. Christine, 687 F.2d 749, 751 (3d Cir. 1982).
2. The purpose of the Program is to provide incentive to lending institutions to grant
loans to eligible home owners by establishing insurance on bank loans. Such insurance is
designed to effectuate improvement of housing in the United States. See Brief for Appel-
lant, app. at 29, Affidavit of Richard Scott.
3. 687 F.2d at 751. The two men allegedly bribed Glenwood Rapf, the loan officer for
the Program at Collective Federal Savings and Loan Association to accept loan applications
from persons who were not creditworthy. Id.
4. Id. Scott's allegations were based on information given to him by Phillip Lake, an
independent salesman who periodically dealt with Landmark Builders, Inc., and Henry Kei-
ser, an individual who also had had interactions with Christine and Grabosky. Id. See also
Brief for Appellant, app. at 29, 30, Affidavit of Richard Scott.
5. 687 F.2d at 751.
6. Id.
7. The offices were located in Absecon, New Jersey. d.
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scribed in the warrant.' A search was conducted the following day
which resulted in the seizure of numerous documents."
On December 10, 1980, a federal grand jury indicted Christine
and Grabosky on ten counts of conspiring to violate and for viola-
tion of 18 U.S.C. § 657 (1976).10 Before the trial, Christine and
8. Id. The warrant provided for seizure of:
(a) All folders and all documents contained therein and all other documents relating
to home improvements and home improvement contracts pursuant to the HUD Title
I Insured Home Improvement Loan program;
(b) All checks, check stubs and bank statements, deposit slips and withdrawal slips,
reflecting the receipt and disbursement of funds through Landmark Builders, Inc. for
the period January 1, 1977 to the present;
(c) All general ledgers, general journals, cash receipt disbursement ledgers and jour-
nals for the period January 1, 1977 to the present;
(d) All correspondence to and from and submissions to Collective Federal Savings
and Loan; and
(e) All other documents, papers, instrumentalities and fruits of the crime of submis-
sion of false statements in connection with the HUD Title I Insured Home Improve-
ment Loan program as well as any evidence of a scheme to defraud HUD or Collec-
tive Federal Savings and Loan or any other creditor by use of the United States
mails.
Id.
9. Id. The items seized included:
prospective, active, and completed job folders; bank statements and check stubs for
1978 and 1979; a customer list; receipts; deposit slips; a job completion summary; two
lease agreements and accompanying cover letter; a loan fee receipt; "salesman
records"; job summary costs; an income statement; a cash disbursements journal; a
writing entitled "Correct Way To Do Business"; a lunch receipt; and a letter to the
press.
Id.
10. Id. See 18 U.S.C. § 657 (1976) which provides in pertinent part:
§ 657. Lending, credit and-insurance institutions
Whoever, being an officer, agent or employee of or connected in any capacity with
the . . . Department of Housing and Urban Development . . . and or any lending,
mortgage, insurance, credit or savings and loan corporation or association authorized
or acting under the laws of the United States or any institution the accounts of which
are insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation or by the Admin-
istrator of the National Credit Union Administration, or any small business invest-
ment company, and, whoever, being a receiver of any such institution, or agent or
employee of the receiver, embezzles, abstracts, purloins or willfully misapplies any
moneys, funds, credits, securities or other things of value belonging to such institu-
tion, or pledged or otherwise intrusted to its care, shall be fined not more than $5,000
or imprisoned not more than five years, or both; but if the amount or value embez-
zled, abstracted, purloined or misapplied does not exceed $100, he shall be fined not
more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
Id. The indictment stated that Christine and Grabosky had caused Rapf to knowingly and
willfully misappropriate funds with the intent to injure and defraud Collective Federal Sav-
ings and Loan Association. In a related claim, Rapf pleaded guilty to the conspiracy charge.
There have been no additional charges brought against Christine, Grabosky, or Rapf. 687
F.2d at 751.
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Grabosky moved to suppress the property seized.1 The District
Court for the District of New Jersey held that the authorization
scope of the search warrant, permitting a search and seizure of all
the corporation's records within several years preceding the time of
the search, was improperly broad in relation to the probable cause
established.12 Inasmuch as the particularity requirement of the
fourth amendment ' s was absent, the district court ruled that all
property seized pursuant to the invalid warrant be suppressed.
1 4
The government presented a motion for reconsideration, assert-
ing that the scope of the warrant was not too broad in light of the
probable cause presented.' The district court refused to reconsider
its decision, stating that the affidavit failed to establish probable
cause that bankruptcy fraud had occurred.1' In response, the
United States appealed the order denying its motion for
reconsideration.
17
On appeal, the government asserted that the search warrant was
not a general warrant, but one which satisfied the particularity re-
quirement of the fourth amendment." Furthermore, the United
States contended that the use of generic words in the search war-
rant to describe seizable possessions does comply with "constitu-
tionally valid" practices.1 9 Moreover, it argued that the generic
11. 687 F.2d at 752.
12. Id. The court held that the showing of probable cause in the affidavit only indi-
cated that Christine and Grabosky had bribed one person at a specific savings institution to
approve particular loan applicants of specific uncreditworthy individuals and that the rele-
vant evidence was obtainable in records at appellee's office. See United States v. Christine,
Crim. No. 80-416, slip op. at 3 (D.N.J. March 12, 1981), motion for reconsideration denied,
slip op. at 3 (D.N.J. May 13, 1981), 687 F.2d 749 (3d Cir. 1982).
13. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
14. 687 F.2d at 752. See also Crim. No. 80-416, slip op. at 3.
15. 687 F.2d at 752. The government argued that the affidavit's content "established
probable cause to believe that appellees were engaged in the Federal crimes of conspiracy,
bankruptcy fraud, and aiding and abetting the misapplication of savings and loan institu-
tion funds." Id.
16. Id. Continuing, the court stated that even if one were to concede that such proba-
ble cause was present, it did not give the executing officer carte blanche to seize all of the
business records of the corporation spanning a four year period. Crim. No. 80-416, slip op. at
3; see also 687 F.2d at 752.
17. 687 F.2d at 752.
18. Id.
19. Id. See supra note 8. Appellant's contention concerned the use of such words in
the warrant as "folders," "general ledgers," and "checks." 687 F.2d at 752.
234 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 22:231
terms were curtailed by language in the warrant which referred to
the alleged crimes.2 0 The government further emphasized that even
if the court were to find that fourth amendment requirements were
absent due to the warrant being overly expansive, total suppres-
sion of the evidence was improper because portions of it were in-
deed valid.2 1 Appellant's final argument was that the affiant had
established sufficient probable cause to justify seizure of all the
records of Landmark Builders, Inc..2" In response, Christine and
Grabosky stated that the district court was correct in holding that
the search warrant was improperly broad. In addition, they as-
serted that the affidavit lacked probable cause, thus rendering the
search warrant invalid as being a general warrant.2 "
Writing for the majority,2 ' Judge Becker first addressed the is-
sue of whether the search warrant was a general warrant,25 con-
20. 687 F.2d at 752. See supra note 8. Section (e) of the warrant refers to "instrumen-
talities and fruits of the crime." 687 F.2d at 752. See also Brief for Appellant at 10.
21. 687 F.2d at 752. See also Brief for Appellant at 14. The United States' concession
was prefaced by its strong assertion that the entire warrant did satisfy the fourth amend-
ment and that only if the court concluded otherwise should evidence seized pursuant to
invalid portions by suppressed.
22. 687 F.2d at 752. See Brief for Appellant at 16. The government stated that the
testimony given by Mr. Lake and Mr. Keiser indicated that appellee's entire business was
fraudulent. 687 F.2d at 752.
23. 687 F.2d at 752. See Brief for Appellee at 16. Appellees contended that the war-
rant contained three flaws: absence of a particular crime allegation, lack of substantiation as
to the credibility of the information rendered, and failure to demonstrate the time span for
the information given. Id.
24. 687 F.2d at 750. Judge Sloviter joined the majority. Id. Judge Gibbons concurred
separately. Id. at 760.
25. 687 F.2d at 752-53. The court noted that in 1971 the United States Supreme Court
found that general warrants authorized "a general exploratory rummaging in a person's be-
longings." See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971). The court further
stated that this violates the fourth amendment which strives to prevent such warrants by
requiring that all items to be seized are described with particularity. 687 F.2d at 752. The
requirement "makes general seraches . . . impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing
under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discre-
tion of the officer executing the warrant." See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196
(1927), quoted in Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 n.7 (1980); Andresen v. Mary-
land, 427 U.S. 463, 479 (1976). The fourth amendment, for example, labels as general those
warrants which authorize searches and seizures of: "smuggled goods," Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 624 (1886); "obscene materials," Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S.
717, 718 (1961); "books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, re-
cordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist Party of Texas," Stan-
ford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 477-78 (1965); "illegally obtained films," United States v. Cook,
657 F.2d 730, 734 (5th Cir. 1981); and "stolen property," United States v. Giresi, 488 F.
Supp. 445, 449 (D.N.J. 1980), aff'd mer., 642 F.2d 444 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 452 U.S.
939 (1981). See infra note 112 and accompanying text; United States v. Burch, 432 F. Supp.
961 (D. Del. 1977), affd mem., 577 F.2d 729 (3d Cir. 1978). See infra notes 109-10 and
accompanying text.
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cluding that the warrant was not. The court based its finding on
the fact that the warrant did not place with the executing officers
unrestrained discretion in their search for evidence."6 Rather, by
instructing that all described items be seized, the magistrate deter-
mined what was to be taken.27
In reviewing the lower court's holding, Judge Becker indicated
that the district court had not examined the case in terms of a
general warrant but had correctly addressed it by balancing the
degree of probable cause created by the affidavit against the
breadth of the search and seizure authorized by the warrant.28 He
stated that, in accordance with the fourth amendment, a magis-
trate may not authorize a search and seizure which exceeds the
degree of probable cause exhibited to him. 9 Judge Becker noted
that although the district court rejected the premise that the war-
26. 687 F.2d at 753. The court noted that the wording in the warrant was both of a
specific and inclusively generic nature, thus controlling the inspector's discretion. Id. Accord
In Re Application of Lafayette Academy, Inc., 462 F. Supp. 767 (D.R.I. 1978), aff'd on other
grounds, 610 F.2d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 1979) (the court found that only some of the material had
been particularly described, and, thus, the district judge suppressed all of the items seized
pursuant to the warrant; this holding was affirmed on appeal, the issue of severability not
addressed by the court).
27. 687 F.2d at 753. The court also stated that the last clause in the warrant, "all other
documents, papers, instrumentalities and fruits of the crime," was not indicative of a gen-
eral warrant. Id. See supra note 8. See also Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 470-77, 479
(1976) (the Court found that the phrase "together with other fruits, instrumentalities, and
evidence of crime at this [time] unknown" was not general as it related to the particular
crime of false pretenses).
28. 687 F.2d at 753.
29. Id. "[A]n otherwise unobjectionable description of the objects to be seized is defec-
tive if it is broader than can be justified by the probable cause upon which the warrant is
based." See 2 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEizURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT §
4.6, at 97 (1978) [hereinafter cited as La Fave]. See also Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442
U.S. 319 (1979) (reversing a denial of motion to suppress evidence which had been seized
pursuant to a warrant akin to a general warrant); United States v. Roche, 614 F.2d 6, 7 (1st
Cir. 1980) (finding a warrant permitting a search and seizure for all "records" too broad in
nature); Montilla Records of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Morales, 575 F.2d 324, 327-28 (1st Cir.
1978) (Cambell, J., concurring) (holding that a search warrant which authorized seizure of
"sound recordings including but not limited to records, cartridges and cassettes" protected
under the Copyright Act did not satisfy the particularity requirement of the fourth amend-
ment and, thus, the seizure was not a valid one); VonderAhe v. Howland, 508 F.2d 364, 368-
70 (9th Cir. 1974) (directly comparing the seized evidence against the probable cause estab-
lished, the court suppressed those items which exceeded the established probable cause);
United States v. Adler, 393 F. Supp. 707 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (concluding that the information
contained in the affidavit failed to establish the requisite probable cause upon which a war-
rant could be properly issued). See generally S. SALTZBURG, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
CASES AND COMMENTARY, 56-57 (1980) [hereinafter cited as SALTZBURG]; Mascolo, Specificity
Requirements for Warrants under the Fourth Amendment; Defining the Zone of Privacy,
73 DICK. L. REv. 1, 4-6 (1968).
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rant was general in nature, it held that the warrant was, neverthe-
less entirely invalid. In reiterating the district court's treatment of
the case, Judge Becker suggested that had the district court con-
sidered redacting the search warrant in order to preserve the valid
clauses and to permit submission of the evidence seized under
those clauses, it may have reached a different conclusion. Judge
Becker noted, however, that the district court's findings were un-
derstandable given that there existed no concise rule in the Third
Circuit concerning redaction at the time of the hearing.31
Judge Becker explained that redaction permits a court to sever a
search warrant, striking those clauses which are invalid due to lack
of probable cause, while preserving those valid clauses of the war-
rant which satisfy the fourth amendment."2 Items seized pursuant
to valid sections, therefore, need not be suppressed, while evidence
seized pursuant to invalid sections is necessarily suppressed."
Addressing precedent in the Third Circuit, the court stated that
this was the first time it had evaluated the principle of redaction in
depth.3 4 In two prior conflicting district court opinions, United
States v. Burch 5 and United States v. Giresi,3 6 which provided
the only discussion on redaction in the Third Circuit, the court of
appeals affirmed both by judgment order. Contrary to Burch, in
Giresi, Judge Coolahan stated that, as a matter of law, redaction
was an acceptable principle. 7 Therein, the court acknowledged
that Burch and two other district courts held otherwise," but fac-
tually distinguished those cases on the basis that the warrants in
question there were dangerously similar to general warrants.3
30. 687 F.2d at 753.
31. Id. at 753-54.
32. Id. at 754. The court noted that each section of the warrant must be examined
individually in order to evaluate whether it is unjustified given the probable cause estab-
lished or whether it is improperly general. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 432 F. Supp. 961 (D. Del. 1977), afl'd mem., 577 F.2d 729 (3d Cir. 1978). Therein,
the court refused to accept the government's argument for partial suppression. See infra
notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
36. 488 F. Supp. 445 (D.N.J. 1980), aff'd mem., 642 F.2d 444 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. de-
nied, 452 U.S. 939 (1981). Id. at 460.
37. 687 F.2d at 755.
38. Id. See In Re Application of Lafayette Academy, Inc., 462 F. Supp. 767 (D.R.I.
1978), aff'd on other grounds, 610 F.2d 1 (lst Cir. 1979), supra note 26; United States v.
Hatfield, 461 F. Supp. 57 (E.D. Tenn. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 599 F.2d 759 (6th Cir.
1979) (holding that the warrant was overbroad in character and, therefore, all evidence
seized must be suppressed).
39. See Giresi, 488 F. Supp. at 460. See also supra note 25.
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In Christine, Judge Becker stated, however, that factual distinc-
tions would not justify avoiding the criticisms concerning redaction
made by the Burch court and that the two holdings in the Third
Circuit concerning the constitutional validity of redaction were di-
rectly contradictory to each other. Judge Becker also noted that
despite the acceptance of redaction in numerous state court pro-
ceedings, support and usage of the principle have generally been
absent in federal courts.40 As such, he emphasized the significance
of the issue to the "administration of criminal justice" in the Third
Circuit, hence necessitating an examination of the constitutionality
of redacting warrants."'
The court prefaced its discussion by noting that an historical
analysis revealed that indiscriminate searches and seizures con-
ducted in the colonies were the motivating force behind the pro-
mulgation of the fourth amendment. 42 The court indicated that the
presence of the warrant clause reflected the necessary balance be-
tween the government's need to enforce its laws and the colonists'
disdain for general searches and seizures.43
Judge Becker wrote that courts have distinguished at least five
separate, but related, purposes utilized by the warrant clause.
First, a requisite showing of probable cause as a precedent to a
warrant's issuance creates a symmetry between the privacy rights
of the citizen against unfounded accusations of crime and the com-
munity's interest in upholding the law.44 Second, the clause pro-
tects individual privacy by precluding law enforcement officers
from acting capriciously in their efforts to impede crime,45 and by
requiring an independent and neutral judicial officer to weigh the
citizen's privacy right against the needs of the law.46 Third, the
40. 687 F.2d at 755. The court again noted the decision in VonderAhe, 508 F.2d 364
(9th Cir. 1974), wherein the court did not redact the warrant but instead matched the mate-
rial seized directly against the scope of probable cause established. See infra notes 74-77
and accompanying text.
41. 687 F.2d at 755.
42. Id. See infra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
43. 687 F.2d at 756.
44. Id. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949). The court therein stated
that the warrant clause protects an individual's interest "in being safeguarded from rash
and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges of crime" while
permitting "fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community's protection." Id. at 176.
45. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948) (officers' search on their own
volition and without a warrant in their attempt to stop crime was unconstitutional as an
individual's right to privacy may be abridged only by an impartial judicial officer, not a
police officer).
46. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948) (search conducted by
police without a warrant violated fourth amendment rights as a magistrate's approval is
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warrant's provisions act as a limitation on the extent of the intru-
sion, 7 with the particularization requirement rendering general
warrants impossible.48 Fourth, the warrant acts as a notification
device that the citizen's privacy right must yield to the public's
need to have the law enforced.49 In addition, the terms of the war-
rant serve to inform the individual that the officer's actions are
lawful, and the extent to which the officer may search and seize.50
Finally, the procedure for obtaining a warrant provides a valuable
transcript for subsequent judicial review as the viability of using a
warrant is dependent upon the information given to the magis-
trate."1 Absent such a condition precedent, the warrant require-
ments of the fourth amendment would be useless."2
necessary to "weigh the need to invade that privacy in order to enforce the law").
47. See Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980) (the Court stated that search
warrant's provisions determine and limit the scope of the officer's search). See also United
States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911, 913 (2d Cir. 1930) (the searching officer's powers to search are
limited given that it is "unreasonable to suppose that an arrest should give wider latitude of
search than a search warrant itself").
48. See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927). The Court therein found that
the requisite particularity requirement renders general searches impossible, thus preventing
an officer from seizing one item when the warrant particularly describes another. Id. at 196.
See also United States v. Jacob, 657 F.2d 49, 52 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1435
(1982), where the court stated, "we think [the warrant] was sufficiently particularized with
respect to the items to be seized. We are further of the opinion that the challenged phrase
should properly be treated as merely superfluous. ... 657 F.2d at 52. See also United
States v. Torch, 609 F.2d 1088 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1980) (a warrant
permitting seizure of items relating to the distribution or promotion of "lewd, lascivious,
and filthy films" was found to be sufficiently specific and, therefore, constitutional).
49. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 226 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(the warrant "assures the occupant that the police officer is present on official business"); In
Re Application of Lafayette Academy, Inc., 610 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1979) (the warrant noti-
fies "the person subject to the search and seizure what the officers are entitled to take");
United States v. Johnson, 541 F.2d 1311, 1315 (8th Cir. 1976) (the individual is provided
with notification that the officer's presence is lawful); United States v. Marti, 421 F.2d 1263,
1268 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 947 (1971) (a search warrant functions to inform
an individual that the officer is empowered to search and seize); United States v. LaMonte,
455 F. Supp. 952, 960 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (the search warrant provides the subject with the
knowledge that the executing officer is legally permitted to search).
50. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (citing Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)). In Chadwick, the Court found that a warrant provides insur-
ance to the person whose property is searched or seized that the officer executing the war-
rant is authorized to search, that there exists a need for his actions, and that his powers to
search are limited. Id. at 9.
51. 687 F.2d at 756-57.
52. See Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971). See also SALTZBURG, supra note 29
at 57. Therein, the author stated:
[P]robable cause is to be shown by persons willing to swear or affirm the truth of
their statements and, thus, to be held accountable for their presentations. In addi-
tion, the applicant for the warrant is committing to a public record the information
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The majority indicated that despite the availability of a civil
damages action to individuals whose fourth amendment rights
have been violated,53 the predominant mode for effectuating one's
rights is via the judicially created exclusionary rule." The majority
relied on the approach presented in Stone v. Powell,"5 wherein the
court stated that the foremost justification for the rule is its deter-
rent effect on police action which violates the fourth amendment.56
They pointed out that the rule has continually been utilized by
federal appellate courts to suppress only that evidence illegally
seized57 in instances in which an officer, acting pursuant to a val-
idly issued warrant, seizes an item which is not authorized. 8
Hence, the exclusionary rule acts as an effective balancing tool59 by
that is known before the search so that, after the search takes place, there is no con-
fusion between the ex-post and ex-ante positions of the applicant.
Id.
53. 687 F.2d at 757. See Monell v. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (local
governing bodies could be subject to damages actions under section 1983 as "persons" where
constitutional deprivations are being alleged against them); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (federal agents' unconstitutional conduct in engaging in an un-
lawful search and seizure gave rise to an action for damages by the injured party); Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled on other grounds, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (police officers'
performance in an illegal search and seizure entitled petitioners to a damages action).
54. 687 F.2d at 757.
55. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
56. 687 F.2d at 757. An additional consideration which the Court observed in Duna-
way v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979), was that convictions which were based on illegally
secured evidence could "compromise the integrity of the courts." Id. at 218.
57. 687 F.2d at 757. Defendants in such cases have continually argued that all evi-
dence seized under the warrant should be suppressed. Id. It is noteworthy that some courts
have allowed submission of evidence not described in the warrant based on the "plain view"
exception. Id. at n.10. See United States v. Scarfo, 685 F.2d 842, 845 (3d Cir. 1982) (Gib-
bons, J., dissenting) (the plain view exception may be employed when the officer is lawfully
on the property, "the discovery must have been inadvertent, and the incriminating nature of
the item must have been immediately apparent"); United States v. Crouch, 648 F.2d 932,
934 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 952 (1981) (officers' reading of letters in the process of
conducting their search and subsequent seizure thereof was proper as the perusal of the
letters "revealed no more than would have been evident to anyone else with normal powers
of observation"); United States v. Ochs, 595 F.2d 1247 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 955
(1979) (the court held that a police officer was entitled to search defendant's car on the basis
of probable cause which existed at the time of the arrest).
58. 687 F.2d at 757. See, e.g., United States v. Dunloy, 584 F.2d 6, 11 n.4 (2d Cir.
1978) (noting that items seized outside the scope of the warrant are subject to suppression);
United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127, 1134 (3d Cir. 1977) (holding that officers' seizure
of materials not described in the warrant did not render the whole search illegal and that
partial suppression was appropriate); United States v. Mendoza, 473 F.2d 692, 696 (5th Cir.
1972) (finding that seizure of evidence not within the boundaries of the warrant did not
affect the admissibility of legally seized evidence). See also Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S.
463, 482 (1976).
59. 687 F.2d at 757. In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 488-89, the Court viewed the
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weighing the heavy cost to the community when illegally seized ev-
idence is suppressed against the goal of deterring police
misconduct.60
Distinguishing the exclusionary rule from situations in which a
general warrant is present, the court emphasized that any evidence
seized pursuant to a general warrant must be suppressed,"' as such
a warrant, clearly in contradiction to fourth amendment objectives,
would result in an intolerable cost to society." Similarly, a warrant
which contains particular descriptions but which lacks prior show-
ing of probable cause must also be invalid given the necessary in-
terdependency between the two."
Addressing the issue at bar, the majority ruled that redaction of
a warrant which contains valid severable portions is compatible
with all five purposes of the warrant requirements." First, a search
and seizure performed pursuant to the warrant's valid clauses is
supported by the underlying probable cause which justifies the
public need for law enforcement." Second, as the warrant to be
redacted is one which was properly issued, the goal of placing a
neutral magistrate between the citizen and the enforcing officer has
"pragmatic analysis of the exclusionary rule's usefulness" as being one in which a balancing
occurs between the private interests protected by the exclusion against the public interest
accomplished by admission of the evidence. Id. See also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338 (1974) (a witness in a grand jury proceeding was not permitted to refuse to answer
questions based on illegally seized evidence because the public benefit outweighed any po-
tential deterrent effects which may occur by excluding evidence); Alderman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (only those whose rights are violated by an unlawful search and
seizure may obtain benefits of the rule as the public interest in prosecuting criminals out-
weighs the possible deterrence achieved by extending the rule's benefits to those who are
not directy injured by the search); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954) (allowing
illegally seized evidence to impeach only collateral testimony of the criminally accused, but
not admissible to impeach testimony made in denial of the offense with which the defendant
was charged).
60. 687 F.2d at 757. Looking to United States v. Russo, 250 F. Supp. 55 (E.D. Pa.
1966), the court pointed out that if a search was merely a general, exploratory one and not
pursuant to the search warrant, the entire search would seem to be invalid. Id. at 758.
61. 687 F.2d at 758. See Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979), supra note
29; Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961);
United States v. Cook, 657 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1981).
62. 687 F.2d at 758. The court stated that there exist no criminal cases which hold to
the contrary. Id.
63. Id. As Justice Stevens stated in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978)
(dissenting opinion), "[t]he requirement that a warrant only issue on a showing of particu-
larized probable cause was the means adopted to circumscribe the warrant power." Id. at
328 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See 687 F.2d at 758 n.12.
64. 687 F.2d at 758. See United States v. Doe, 703 F.2d 745, 750 (3d Cir. 1983) (the
court approvingly referred to the five functions reviewed by the Christine court).
65. 687 F.2d at 758.
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been satisfied. 66 Third, although the terms of the warrant may out-
weigh the probable cause established, redaction serves to preserve
that evidence seized pursuant to the valid particularly described
portions of the warrant without ratifying those invalid general
phrases.67 Fourth, with respect to the valid clauses in the warrant
preserved by redaction, the individual is notified that the execut-
ing officer is acting within his lawful authority, that there is a need
for the search, and that his powers are limited.68 Last, redaction
does not impede the existence of a record susceptible to later judi-
cial review.69
Applying the logical analysis motivating the exclusionary rule to
the issue of redaction, the court ruled that redaction not only satis-
fies the warrant clause and law enforcement objectives, but it also
evades the social cost incurred in suppressing validly seized evi-
dence.70 Furthermore, suppressing such evidence results in a high
societal cost so that the lesser benefits derived by the fourth
amendment are outweighed, thus rendering total suppression
unjustifiable.
In its analysis, the court reviewed the Delaware district court's
opinion in United States v. Burch 7 1 where the district court re-
fused to treat the search as two separate ones.72 Judge Becker sug-
gested that the Burch court's disdain for redaction may have been
partially grounded in the second reason behind the exclusionary





70. Id. The majority noted that other courts have recognized that use of redaction is
analogous to situations in which evidence has been seized because of overreaching of a war-
rant's authorization. In both situations, only the items seized under clauses unsupported by
probable cause have been suppressed. Id. See United States v. Cook, 657 F.2d 730 (5th Cir.
1981), supra note 25; United States v. Giresi, 488 F. Supp. 445 (D.N.J. 1980), aff'd mem.,
642 F.2d 444 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 939 (1981), supra notes 36-39 and accom-
panying text; People v. Mangialino, 75 Misc. 2d 698, 348 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1973), infra note
102.
71. 432 F. Supp. 961 (D. Del 1977), aff'd mem., 577 F.2d 729 (3d'Cir. 1978). See supra
notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
72. 687 F.2d at 759. The Burch court's reasoning, according to Judge Becker, would
require either that all evidence be suppressed or that illegal seizures be ignored. Judge
Becker reasoned that neither approach is acceptable as the former renounces the pragmatic
basis found in the exclusionary rule, while the latter needlessly forsakes the individual's
rights for those interests of the law enforcement. He concluded, therefore, that the solution
is to apply redaction principles. Id.
1983
Duquesne Law Review
fear, Judge Becker asserted, is more fictional than real."
The majority found that the Burch court's concern with a fiction
which would cause courts to ignore fourth amendment principles
was more accurately associated with the position stated in Vonder-
Ahe v. Howland. Therein, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit found that a reviewing court need not consider the warrant,
and, thus, the probable cause established by the magistrate and
the scope of the search and seizure thereby authorized. Rather, the
court should review de novo the government's case for a search and
seizure.7 5 This stance, the majority asserted, causes the magis-
trate's mediation between the citizen and the state, to act merely
as a formality.7 1 In addition, the majority emphasized that in its
failure to require that a warrant be significantly valid, as is de-
manded by redaction, the VonderAhe approach was inconsistent
with the notification principle of the warrant clause because it
failed to insure the individual that the executing officer was em-
powered to search."
Concluding that redaction is an effective constitutionally viable
principle, 78 the court stated that this was an appropriate case to
apply principles of redaction. Although it had both the warrant
and affidavit in its possession, thereby enabling it to redact the
warrant, the court ruled that such a task should be undertaken by
the district court.7 9 The court opined that the lower court should
73. Id. The Burch court emphasized that redaction does not condone the admission of
illegally seized evidence. In addition, if the warrant as a whole is general in nature or is an
abuse of the prospective use of redaction, the entire search and seizure may be deemed
illegal. Id.
74. Id. In VonderAhe, 508 F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1974), the court matched the evidence
seized against the underlying probable cause in the warrant, ignoring the terms of the war-
rant and, thus, the import of the warrant clause to the scheme of the fourth amendment. Id.
75. 687 F.2d at 759.
76. Id. This intervention is designed to assess the state intrusion on the privacy of the
citizen. Id.
77. Id. Stressing the flaws in the VonderAhe decision, the majority stated that a per-
son could be served with an entirely invalid warrant and yet illegally seized evidence may be
admitted on the basis of an affidavit which the individual never saw until after the comple-
tion of the search. Id.
78. Id. The court further indicated that the district court's failure to consider redac-
tion as an alternative to suppressing all the evidence was because it lacked clear direction on
the issue. Had it reviewed the principle, the district court might have ruled differently. Id.
79. Id. The court reasoned that the appeal was not a post-conviction one and that the
case had to be remanded in any event for further proceedings. Id. The majority also held
that, although it did not address all the issues raised on appeal, appellee's contention that
the warrant was invalid based on a test established in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410
(1969), was without merit. In Spinelli, the Court held that an informant's tips must be
tested for creditability and trustworthiness. The Christine court held that Lake and Keiser
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not direct its attention to the sum of the materials authorized by
the warrant to be seized, but should instead review each severable
clause in order to evaluate if each is supported by probable cause.
The court thus stated that only those clauses which lack such sup-
port should be invalidated.80
The court further suggested that the district court, in its review
of the suppression motion, should bear in mind that the warrant
herein authorized a search and seizure of mere evidence.8 1 There-
fore, probable cause must be reviewed in terms of cause to believe
that the desired evidence will assist in obtaining a particular ap-
prehension or conviction.8 2 In addition, the court observed that the
reviewing court must not approach the case in a "hypertechnical
manner," and affidavit and warrant are to be tested in a logical
and realistic manner. 83 Indeed, the fourth amendment neither pro-
hibits a search because it cannot be executed with surgical exact-
ness, nor does it forbid seizure of evidence because it may contain
additional information not within the purview of the warrant."
were not anonymous informants and their creditability as well as the basis upon which they
decided that appellees were acting illegally was stated in Scott's affidavit. 687 F.2d at 759
n.14.
80. 687 F.2d at 759-60. The court referred to Aday v. Supreme Court of Alameda
County, 55 Cal. 2d 789, 362 P.2d 47, 13 Cal. Rptr. 415 (1961), in recognizing that the district
court may decline to apply redaction if it assesses that such an approach would be an abuse
of the warrant procedure. However, the court did not advise that such a determination ap-
ply in this case. 687 F.2d at 760 n.15.
81. 687 F.2d at 760.
82. Id. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967) (the value of the probable
cause must be examined in order to determine if the evidence sought will assist in the ap-
prehension and conviction of criminals and, thus, police purposes must be considered).
83. 687 F.2d at 760. See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965) (advocat-
ing a simple approach, as "the fourth amendment's commands, like all constitutional re-
quirements, are practical and not abstract"); United States v. Newman, 685 F.2d 90, 92 (3d
Cir. 1982) (the warrant's authorization to search for a shotgun, ammunition, and papers
concerning the gun permitted a search of containers in which the items might reasonably
have been placed).
84. 687 F.2d at 760. See United States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1979) (the
court stated that the affiant's information was of sufficient detail to permit the magistrate to
infer the source's identity, explicit identification being unnecessary to sustain the affidavit's
validity). The Christine court noted that this flexibility is useful in cases concerning com-
plex schemes extending over many years that can be disclosed only by scrutinizing intricate
financial records. 687 F.2d at 760. In addition, the majority referred to the Supreme Court's
recognition of the accompanying problems of white collar crime which must be accommo-
dated in Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 n.10 (1976). In Andresen, the Court dis-
agreed with petitioner's assertion that the warrant was a general one. It found that the
illegal real estate scheme was so complex that it required a piecing together of many bits of
evidence in order tn prove its existence. Displayed singly, the evidence would have been of
little worth; the Andresen Court concluded that the intricacy of an illegal scheme may not
act as a barrier to detection when the state has established probable cause to believe that a
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Hence, generic descriptions in a warrant are acceptable when spe-
cific classifications are not practical.8 ' Similarly, in the course of
the search, some innocuous documents will undoubtedly be ex-
amined in order to evaluate whether they are among those items
authorized to be seized.80 Advising the lower court to bear in mind
the content of its opinion, the court ruled that the district court's
order be vacated and the cause remanded for reconsideration.
In his concurring opinion, Judge Gibbons stated that although
he generally agreed with the court, he was hesitant about portions
of the majority's analysis.'7 He skeptically agreed that deterrence
of police misconduct as a rationale for the exclusionary rule is rele-
vant when evidence is seized pursuant to a search and seizure
which lacks merit. He asserted, however, that when a judicially au-
thorized warrant is duly executed, this deterrence rationale is com-
pletely illogical." Judge Gibbons further recognized that when a
court suppresses evidence,'8 in effect, it is wielding appellate re-
view over the judicial function of the issuing magistrate. Thus, the
fourth amendment provides the courts with the affirmative obliga-
tion to prohibit the dissemination of information which is entitled
to remain private. He further found that the majority's use of re-
daction was entirely compatible with his stance that illegally seized
evidence is a fourth amendment violation independent of and dis-
tinct from any violation committed by the police.90
In conclusion, Judge Gibbons proposed that on remand the dis-
trict court's analysis concerning what evidence should be sup-
pressed should extend beyond that of matching the seized evidence
crime has occurred and that supporting evidence is in the suspect's possession. Id. at 478-84.
85. 687 F.2d at 760. See, e.g., United States v. Cook, 657 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Cortetlesso, 601 F.2d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1072
(1980) (the court found that two tests must be satisfied before generic descriptions will be
sustained in a warrant: "the evidence presented . . . must establish that there is reason to
believe that a large collection of similar contraband is present on the premises to be
searched, and.. .the evidence.. . must explain the method by which the executing agents
are to differentiate the contraband from the rest of defendant's inventory").
86. 687 F.2d at 760.
87. Id. (Gibbons, C.J., concurring).
88. Id. at 761 (Gibbons, C.J., concurring). Judge Gibbons stated that when a police
officer obtains a warrant from a magistrate and acts in accordance with its terms, he has
reasonably performed his duties. Id.
89. Id. A suppression occurs either because the items to be searched for were inade-
quately particularized or because the affidavit prompting the warrant was insufficient. d.
90. Id. The Scott affidavit permitted entry to the property and seizure of some prop-
erty which lost its shield of privacy and, therefore, to this extent there was no invasion of
privacy. Conversely, if property is seized absent underlying probable cause, there has been
an invasion of privacy; an act the court cannot condone. Id.
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against the probable cause showing.91 In addition, he maintained,
it should evaluate whether additional evidence seized was permis-
sible under the plain view doctrine.92
Historically, the oppressive nature of searches and seizure con-
ducted in England and the colonies motivated the founding fathers
to frame the fourth amendment as a constitutional safeguard
against invasions of privacy. 93 In 1662, the English Parliament au-
thorized writs of assistance in order to decrease the smuggling
which was occurring in England.94 The writs did not require a
showing of probable cause prior to their issuance, nor was there
any limitation placed on the extent to which an officer could con-
duct a search.95
Thirty-four years later, the writs were ordered for use in the col-
onies.96 Pervasive use of such searches and seizures effectively
caused judicial control to be replaced by police control.97 Resis-
tance by the colonists against the writs was evidenced in 1761
when James Otis, an attorney, denounced the hated writs of assis-
tance,98 a disdain which was further exemplified by several colonies
91. Id. He noted that the executing officers were acting lawfully in performing their
duties of perusing the company's books and records pursuant to the valid portions of the
warrant. Id.
92. Id. The plain view doctrine was reviewed in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443 (1971), where Justice Stewart found that items not mentioned in a search warrant which
were found by an officer in the course of his search may, under certain circumstances, be
admissible.
93. See W.E. RINGEL, SEARCHES & SEizuRES ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS, § 1 at 2 (1972)
where it is stated:
The adoption of this Amendment, it was held, was inspired by the desire of the
founding fathers and their constituents to establish real safeguards against a recur-
rence of the arbitrary searches and seizures that occurred in the Colonies prior to the
Revolution and which even continued in England after that time.
Id.
94. See generally Bloom, Warrant Requirement - The Burger Court Approach, 53 U.
COLO. L. REv. 691, 694 (1982).
95. Id.
96. Id. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (such warrants, akin to general
warrants, were known in the Colonies as "writs of assistance"); Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616 (1886) (the writs were easily issued and provided customs officials with unlimited
authority to search for goods imported in violation of British tax laws).
97. See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959) ("the general warrant ... and
the writs of assistance . . . both perpetuated the oppressive practice of allowing the police
to arrest and search on suspicion"); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. at 625 (the writs caused
"the liberty of every man [to be] in the hands of every petty officer").
98. Bloom, supra note 94, at 694. Otis asserted that the writs were a violation of "one
of the most essential branches of English liberty [which] is the freedom of one's house. A
man's house is his castle. . . . This writ, if it should be declared legal, would totally annihi-
late this privilege." Id. at 695.
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adopting amendments proscribing these general warrants."' In
1791, the founding fathers remedied this flagrant abuse of power
and the fourth amendment became an integral component of the
United States Constitution. 100
The historical concern with an individual's right to privacy has
been a persistent preoccupation of the courts. Unlike situations in
which a search warrant was valid on its face and evidence obtained
exceeded that described in the warrant, Christine involved evi-
dence that was seized pursuant to a search warrant which con-
tained both valid and invalid portions.101 Although state courts
have favorably applied redaction in these instances, 02 historically,
federal courts have generally not utilized this alternative to total
suppression.' 03
99. See W. E. RINGEL, supra note 93, § 2 at 3. One such provision was included in the
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 which provided that:
Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches, and seizures, of
his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions. All warrants, therefore, are
contrary to this right, if the cause or foundation of them be not previously supported
by oath of affirmation; and if the order in the warrant to a civil officer, to make
search in suspected places, or to arrest one or more suspected persons, or to seize
their property, be not accompanied with a special designation of the persons or ob-
jects of search, arrest, or seizure: and no warrant out to be issued but in cases, and
with the formalties prescribed by the laws.
See MAss. CONST. OF 1780, pt. 1, art. 14.
100. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213 (1979) (the colonists' disdain for the
general warrants was "a prime motivaiton for the adoption of the fourth amendment"). See
generally N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, 13-78 (1937).
101. This distinction is important because in the former situation courts have had
little difficulty in suppressing evidence which exceeded the warrant's boundaries. See In Re
Search Warrant Dated July 4, 1977, 667 F.2d 117 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (search warrant held
valid, with only evidence seized outside of the warrant illegal and, therefore, suppressed).
102. See Aday v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 55 Cal. 2d 789, 362 P.2d 47, 13
Cal. Rptr. 415 (1961). Therein, the court (in the leading state case) held that defective por-
tions of the search warrant should not render the entire warrant invalid. Instead, only evi-
dence seized pursuant to such invalid clauses should be suppressed. Emphasizing that re-
daction would not compromise fourth amendment requirements, the court wrote that "an
abuse of the warrant procedure of course could not be tolerated." 55 Cal. 2d at 797, 362 P.2d
at 52, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 420. See also People v. Mangialino, 75 Misc. 2d 698, 348 N.Y.S.2d 327
(1973) (no reason existed to totally suppress illegally seized evidence when severance can
save a partially valid warrant); Walthall v. State, 594 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980)
(holding that evidence seized pursuant to unconstitutionally general clauses warranted par-
tial suppression). But see Kinsey v. State, 602 P.2d 240 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979) (finding
that although some items were specifically named in the warrant, it was general in nature,
and, therefore, all items were suppressed, even those specifically mentioned in the warrant).
103. See United States v. Cook, 657 F.2d 730, 734 (5th Cir. 1981), where the court
acknowledged that, to date, alternatives to total suppression had never been addressed by
any United States Court of Appeals. See also United States v. Giresi, 488 F. Supp. 445
(D.N.J. 1980), affd. mem., 642 F.2d 444 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 939 (1981).
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In 1975, the Ninth Circuit, in VonderAhe v. Howland,10 4 was
presented with a situation similar to that in Christine.0 5 Although
the court suppressed only part of the evidence, 0 6 it declined to
sever the warrant. Rather, it balanced the seized evidence directly
against the probable cause established, excluding any evidence
which exceeded the probable cause.'0 7 The court emphasized that
allowing total suppression would result in inequity and, therefore,
partial suppression was a viable solution. 08 Two years later, the
District Court for the District of Delaware denied the govern-
ment's request for redaction in United States v. Burch,'09 finding
that such an application would violate those interests protected by
the fourth amendment; accordingly, all the items seized were
suppressed."'
In 1981, Burch, which had been affirmed by the Third Circuit,
was rejected by the same circuit in United States v. Giresi."' In
Giresi, the Third Circuit found that invalid portions of a search
warrant did not warrant total suppression of seized evidence unless
a warrant was facially general."' Instead, the court concluded, as a
The Giresi court stated that there existed a "curious division of opinion" with regard to
severability between the federal and state courts. Id. at 459.
104. 508 F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1975).
105. In VonderAhe, a warrant was issued to search a dentist's office after a former
employee of the doctor informed the Internal Revenue Service that two sets of records were
kept by the office and that only one set had been submitted for a recent audit. Although the
Service specifically knew which records it needed, the search warrant contained clauses
which were overbroad and non-specific. Id. at 369.
106. Id. at 372.
107. Id. It is important to emphasize that the VonderAhe court's approach of directly
comparing the seized material against the probable cause differs from the practice of redac-
tion. Redaction occurs when a court first examines the warrant, severing the valid and inva-
lid portions, thereafter categorizing the seized items in accordance with the warrant's
clauses, suppressing only that evidence seized pursuant to invalid portions. 687 F.2d at 754.
108. 508 F.2d at' 372. The court stated, "if the facts are.. . that the taxpayers...
deliberately concealed income and failed to pay taxes thereon, it would seem to be the
height of inequity for the courts to enable them to profit thereby." Id.
109. 432 F. Supp. 961 (D. Del. 1977), aff'd mem., 577 F.2d 729 (3d Cir. 1978). In
Burch, the warrant authorized a search and seizure of "automobile tires. . . and other un-
known articles which [were] believed and reported to be stolen from Penn Central Rail-
road." Id. at 962. The government sought admittance of the tires only and suppression of
the rest. Id. at 964.
110. Id. Therein, the government requested the court to find that there had been two
searches: one pursuant to the specific item mentioned in the warrant (the tires), and the
other an invalid search for "other unknown items." Id. Judge Stapleton rejected this ap-
proach, holding, "there was only one search, that search [which] unlimited in its scope as it
was, violated the fourth amendment." Id.
111. 488 F. Supp. 445 (D.N.J. 1980), aff'd mem., 642 F.2d 444 (3d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 939 (1981).
112. 488 F. Supp. at 459. Although the court distinguished Burch by asserting that the
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matter of law, that the practice of redaction was fully consistent
with the spirit and purpose of the fourth amendment."'
In the same year, the Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Cook,"
4
affirmatively addressed the issue of redaction, finding that the dis-
trict. court had erred in failing to sever the search warrant. The
court emphasized that partial suppression not only effectuated
fourth amendment aims, but also acted as an effective deterrent to
the improper government practice of failing to particularly de-
scribe the terms of a warrant."
5
The accepted practice that the existence of a general warrant
necessarily prohibits invoking redaction was illustrated by a recent
Ninth Circuit decision. 1 6 In United States v. Cardwell, the court
acknowledged that although alternatives to total suppression of
wrongfully seized evidence did exist, the warrant therein was not
salvageable as it was general in nature.1
7
The very same day that United States v. Christine was decided,
The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Freeman,"a held that a
search warrant may, in proper instances, be severed so as to pre-
serve the valid clauses and evidence seized pursuant thereto."'
Burch warrant was general in nature and, therefore, redaction was inappropriate, the Giresi
court did state that the Burch court disagreed with the severance doctrines. Id. at 460.
113. Id. Judge Coolahan referred to the redaction practice as "severance," stating that
it did not contradict "the implied fourth amendment prohibition against general warrants."
Id.
114. 657 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1981). In Cook, the search warrant authorized a search
and seizure of "cassettes onto which . . . copyrighted films . . . ha[d] been electronically
transferred and recorded." Id. at 732.
115. Id. at 735. The court stated:
Items that were not described with the requisite particularity in the warrant should
be suppressed, but suppression of all the fruits of the search is hardly consistent with
the purpose underlying exclusion. Suppression of only the items improperly described
prohibits the government from profiting from its own wrong and removes the court
from considering illegally obtained evidence.
Id.
116. See United States v. Cardwell, 680 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1982).
117. Id. at 78-79. The court premised its stance in support of severability upon a foot-
note in Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976). Although the Supreme Court did not
directly address the issue of redaction, in dicta the Court stated, "we observe that to the
extent such papers were not within the scope of the warrants or were otherwise improperly
seized, the State was correct in returning them voluntarily and the trial judge was correct in
suppressing others." Id at 482 n.11. It is noted that although the Christine court agreed
with the Cardwel ruling, it did not agree with the Ninth Circuit's view that Andresen ap-
proved of redaction. United States v. Christine, 687 F.2d at 754 n.5. See also United States
v. Dunloy, 584 F.2d 6, 11 n.4 (2d Cir. 1978) (interpreting the Andresen footnote to mean
that partial suppression was an acceptable practice).
118. 685 F.2d at 942 (5th Cir. 1982). Both cases were decided on August 30, 1982.
119. Id. at 952. Judge Randall emphasized the logic of applying principles of redac-
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The warrant in Freeman contained portions which were defective
on the basis of insufficient probable cause to support a search for
items described therein, thus rendering those clauses invalid.
120
Similar to earlier decisions, the Freeman court prefaced its support
for redaction by stating that the warrant itself must be compatible
with fourth amendment interests, thereby permitting severance to
occur while preserving the valid clauses of the warrant.
Most recently, the Third Circuit affirmed the Christine court's
decision condoning redaction in United States v. Johnson.
2
,
While acknowledging that redaction is a viable practice, the court




The novelty of redaction as a viable alternative to total suppres-
sion is evidenced by the fact that there appears to be scant critique
of and commentary concerning the practice. It is noteworthy that
redaction has been condoned by Professor LaFave, the often cited
commentator of scholarly works concerning the fourth amend-
ment."13 In one of his treatises,"4 he asserted that total suppres-
sion was a severe procedure to invoke when a search warrant con-
tained clauses in accordance with fourth amendment requirements
as well as clauses which were not."1
6
It is clear, therefore,that this alternative to total suppression is a
recent and conservatively invoked practice. Unlike prior court
holdings concerning redaction, the Christine decision carefully an-
alyzed and justified its decision by analogizing redaction with the
tion, stating, "[i]f the police have probable cause to search for item A but not for item B,
and a warrant is issued for both, it seems unfair to law enforcement officials not to allow A
in if the search was otherwise properly conducted." Id. (quoting 1 LAFAVE, supra note 29, §
3.7 at 714-15).
120. Id. The Freeman court factually distinguished the prior Fifth Circuit decision in
United States v. Cook, 657 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1981), from the facts in Freeman, finding that
the warrant used in Cook was partially defective because portions offended the particularity
requirement of the fourth amendment. Id. Nevertheless, the Freeman court found Cook to
be controlling precedent and, in addition, cited Aday v. Superior Court of Alameda County,
55 Cal. 2d 789, 362 P.2d 47, 13 Cal. Rptr. 415 (1961), as being instructive, as well. Id.
121. 690 F.2d 60 (3d Cir. 1982).
122. Id. at 68 (citing Christine, 687 F.2d at 758, for the proposition that general war-
rants are not tolerable to society, the court stated that use of redaction "makes it more
important than ever that general warrants be identified as such").
123. See 2 W. LAFAvE, supra note 29, § 4.6, at 111-12 (1978).
124. Id.
125. Id. The author stated, "it would be harsh medicine indeed if a warrant which was
issued on probable cause and which did particularly describe certain items were to be invali-
dated in toto merely because the affiant and magistrate erred in seeking and permitting a
search for other items as well." Id.
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exclusionary rule as well as reviewing the compatibility of redac-
tion with the functions of the fourth amendment's warrant
clause.12 Judge Becker's review of the exclusionary rule's goals,
that of deterring improper police action as well as upholding the
integrity of the judicial system by preventing a conviction based
upon illegally seized evidence, well illustrated that partial suppres-
sion may be employed without compromising fourth amendment
interests.12 7 His discussion convincingly showed that the same
goals may be effectuated when a warrant is severed pursuant to
principles of redaction. The court's analysis that redaction is con-
sistent with the warrant clause's five functions is somewhat weak,
however, as redaction does not precisely conform to the clause's
fourth function. 12 8 According to this aim, the warrant is intended
to notify the individual, at the time of the search, as to the limits
of the officer's power to search. However, the individual does not
know that the warrant contains valid and invalid portions and,
hence, he or she believes the limits of the officer's power to search
are greater than they actually are.
The court's finding that principles of redaction are compatible
with the Constitution and are economically beneficial to society il-
lustrates the natural development of redaction as a useful tool in
the criminal justice system. The court's strong support for this
practice is tempered when, as had his predecessors, Judge Becker
stressed that a search warrant must first satisfy fourth amendment
requirements in order to invoke severance as an alternative to total
suppression. To this end, the Christine decision is a sound one.
Future courts, however, must expound guidelines in order to refine
the application of redaction. This is necessary to maintain a bal-
ance between societal interests inherent in the criminal justice sys-
tem and fundamental rights sought to be protected by the fourth
amendment.
Julie Alexa Strauss
126. 687 F.2d at 757.
127. Id. For a discussion of the purposes of the exclusionary rule, see LaFave, The
Fourth Amendment In An Imperfect World: On Drawing "Bright Lines" and "Good
Faith," 43 U. Pirr L. REV. 307, 316 (1982). Therein, the learned scholar enumerated three
aims: (1) the courts do not want to be an accomplice to unconstitutional behavior; (2) by
excluding evidence, the public is assured that illegal conduct by the government will not be
rewarded, thus, reducing the danger of distrust toward the government; (3) exclusion acts as
a deterrent to future illegal searches and seizures. Id. at 316-17. It is because of these pur-
poses that the aforementioned balancing is necessary. Id.
128. 687 F.2d at 756. See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
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